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Abstract. We present a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC for
reasoning about statistical knowledge. We consider conditional statements over
proportions of the domain and are interested in the probabilistic-logical conse-
quences of these proportions. After introducing some general reasoning problems
and analyzing their properties, we present first algorithms and complexity results
for reasoning in some fragments of StatisticalALC.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic logics enrich classical logics with probabilities in order to incorporate un-
certainty. In [5], probabilistic logics have been classified into three types that differ in
the way how they handle probabilities. Type 1 logics enrich classical interpretations
with probability distributions over the domain and are well suited for reasoning about
statistical probabilities. This includes proportional statements like “2% of the popula-
tion suffer from a particular disease.” Type 2 logics consider probability distributions
over possible worlds and are better suited for expressing subjective probabilities or de-
grees of belief. For instance, a medical doctor might say that she is 90% sure about her
diagnosis. Type 3 logics combine type 1 and type 2 logics allow to reason about both
kinds of uncertainty.
One basic desiderata of probabilistic logics is that they generalize a classical logic.
That is, the probabilistic interpretation of formulas with probability 1 should agree with
the classical interpretation. However, given that first-order logic is undecidable, a prob-
abilistic first-order logic that satisfies our basic desiderata will necessarily be undecid-
able. In order to overcome the problem, we can, for instance, restrict to Herbrand inter-
pretations over a fixed domain [2,9,13] or consider decidable fragments like description
logics [3, 8, 10].
Probabilistic type 2 extensions of description logics have been previously studied
in [11]. In the unpublished appendix of this work, a type 1 extension of ALC is pre-
sented along with a proof sketch for EXPTIME-completeness of the corresponding sat-
isfiability problem. This type 1 extension enriches classical interpretations with proba-
bility distributions over the domain as suggested in [5]. We consider a similar, but more
restrictive setting here. We are interested in anALC extension that allows statistical rea-
soning. However, we do not impose a probability distribution over the domain. Instead,
we are only interested in reasoning about the proportions of a population satisfying
some given properties. For instance, given statistical information about the relative fre-
quency of certain symptoms, diseases and the relative frequency of symptoms given
diseases, one can ask the relative frequency of a disease given a particular combination
of symptoms. Therefore, we consider only classical ALC interpretations with finite do-
mains and are interested in the relative proportions that are true in these interpretations.
Hence, interpretations in our framework can be regarded as a subset of the interpre-
tations in [11], namely those with finite domains and a uniform probability distribution
over the domain. These interpretations are indeed sufficient for our purpose. In particu-
lar, by considering strictly less interpretations, we may be able to derive tighter answer
intervals for some queries. Our approach bears some resemblance to the random world
approach from [4]. However, the authors in [4] consider possible worlds with a fixed
domain size N and are interested in the limit of proportions as N goes to infinity. We
are interested in all finite possible worlds that satisfy certain proportions and ask what
statistical statements must be true in all these worlds.
We begin by introducing Statistical ALC in Section 2 together with three relevant
reasoning problems. Namely, the Satisfiability Problem, the l-Entailment problem and
the p-Entailment problem. In Section 3, we will then discuss some logical properties of
StatisticalALC . In Section 4 and 5, we present first computational results for fragments
of Statistical ALC.
2 StatisticalALC
We start by revisiting the classical description logic ALC. Given two disjoint sets NC
of concept names and NR of role names, ALC concepts are built using the grammar
rule C ::= ⊤ | A | ¬C | C ⊓ C | ∃r.C, where A ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. One can
express disjunction, universal quantification and subsumption through the usual logical
equivalences like C1 ⊔ C2 ≡ ¬(¬C1 ⊓ ¬C2). For the semantics, we focus on finite
interpretations. An ALC interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) consist of a non-empty, finite
domain ∆I and an interpretation function ·I that maps concept names A ∈ NC to sets
AI ⊆ ∆I and roles names r ∈ NR to binary relations rI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I . Two ALC
concepts C1, C2 are equivalent (C1 ≡ C2) iff CI1 = C
I
2 for all interpretations I.
Here, we consider a probabilistic extension of ALC. Statistical ALC knowledge
bases consist of probabilistic conditionals that are built up overALC concepts.
Definition 1 (Conditionals, Statistical KB). A probabilistic ALC conditional is an
expression of the form (C | D)[ℓ, u], where C,D are ALC concepts and ℓ, u ∈ Q are
rational numbers such that 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ u ≤ 1. A statistical ALC knowledge base (KB) is
a set K of probabilisticALC conditionals.
For brevity, we usually call probabilisticALC conditionals simply conditionals.
Example 2. Let Kflu = {(∃has.fever | ∃has.flu)[0.9, 0.95], (∃has.flu | ⊤)[0.01, 0.03]}.
Kflu states that 90 to 95 percent of patients who have the flu have fever, and that only 1
to 3 percent of patients have the flu.
Intuitively, a conditional (C | D)[ℓ, u] expresses that the relative proportion of elements
ofD that also belong to C is between ℓ and u. In order to make this more precise, con-
sider a finite ALC interpretation I, and an ALC concept X . We denote the cardinality
of XI by [X ]I , that is, [X ]I := |XI |. The interpretation I satisfies (C | D)[ℓ, u],
written as I |= (C | D)[ℓ, u], iff either [D]I = 0 or
[C ⊓D]I
[D]I
∈ [ℓ, u]. (1)
I satisfies a statisticalALC knowledge baseK iff it satisfies all conditionals inK. In this
case, we call I a model of K and write I |= K. We denote the set of all models of K by
Mod(K). As usual, K is consistent ifMod(K) 6= ∅ and inconsistent otherwise. We call
two knowledge basesK1,K2 equivalent and writeK1 ≡ K2 iffMod(K1) = Mod(K2).
Example 3. Consider again the KB Kflu from Example 2. Let I be an interpretation
with 1000 individuals. 10 of these have the flu and 9 have both the flu and fever. Then
I ∈ Mod(Kflu).
In classical ALC, knowledge bases are defined by a set of general concept inclu-
sions (GCIs) C ⊑ D that express that C is a subconcept of D. An interpretation I
satisfies C ⊑ D iff CI ⊆ DI . As shown next, GCIs can be seen as a special kind of
conditionals, and hence statisticalALC KBs are a generalization of classicalALC KBs.
Proposition 4. For all statistical ALC interpretations I, we have I |= C ⊑ D iff
I |= (D | C)[1, 1].
Proof. If I |= C ⊑ D then CI ⊆ DI and CI ∩ DI = CI . If CI = ∅, we have
[C]I = 0. Otherwise [C⊓D]
I
[C]I
= 1. Hence, I |= (D | C)[1, 1].
Conversely, assume I |= (D | C)[1, 1]. If [C]I = 0, then CI = ∅ and I |= C ⊑ D.
Otherwise,
[C⊓D]I
[C]I = 1, that is, [C ⊓D]
I = [C]I . If there was a d ∈ CI \DI , we had
[C ⊓D]I < [C]I , hence, we have CI ⊆ DI and I |= C ⊑ D. ⊓⊔
Given a statistical ALC knowledge base K, the first problem that we are interested in
is deciding consistency of K. We define the satisfiability problem for statistical ALC
knowledge bases as usual.
Satisfiability Problem: Given a knowledge base K, decide whetherMod(K) 6= ∅.
Example 5. Consider again the knowledge base Kflu from Example 2. The conditional
(∃has.flu | ⊤)[0.01, 0.03] implies that [∃has.flu]I ≥ 0.01 for all models I ∈Mod(Kflu).
(∃has.fever | ∃has.flu)[0.9, 0.95] implies [∃has.fever⊓∃has.flu]I ≥ 0.9[∃has.flu]I . There-
fore, [∃has.fever]I ≥ [∃has.fever ⊓ ∃has.flu]I ≥ 0.9[∃has.flu]I ≥ 0.009. Hence, adding
the conditional (∃has.fever | ⊤)[0, 0.005]} renders Kflu inconsistent.
If K is consistent, we are interested in deriving (implicit) probabilistic conclusions. We
can think of different reasoning problems in this context. First, we can define an en-
tailment relation analogously to logical entailment. Then, the probabilistic conditional
(C | D)[ℓ, u] is an l-consequence of the KB K iff Mod(K) ⊆ Mod({(C | D)[ℓ, u]}).
In this case, we write K |=l (C | D)[ℓ, u]. In the context of type 2 probabilistic condi-
tionals, this entailment relation has also been called just logical consequence [9].
l-Entailment Problem: Given a knowledge base K and a conditional (C | D)[ℓ, u],
decide whether K |=l (C | D)[ℓ, u].
Example 6. Consider again the KB Kflu from Example 2. As explained in Example 5,
[∃has.fever]I ≥ 0.009 holds for all models I ∈ Mod(K). Therefore, it follows that
Kflu |=l (∃has.fever | ⊤)[0.009, 1]. That is, our statistical information suggests that at
least 9 out of 1, 000 of our patients have fever.
Example 7. Consider a domain with birds (B), penguins (P) and flying animals (F). We
let Kbirds = {(B | ⊤)[0.5, 0.6], (F | B)[0.85, 0.9], (F | P )[0, 0]}. Note that the con-
ditional (F | B)[0.85, 0.9] is actually equivalent to (¬F | B)[0.1, 0.15]. Furthermore,
for all I ∈ Mod(Kbirds), (F | P )[0, 0] implies [P ⊓ F ]I = 0. Therefore, we have
[P ⊓B]I = [B ⊓ P ⊓ F ]I + [B ⊓ P ⊓ ¬F ]I ≤ 0 + [B ⊓ ¬F ]I ≤ 0.15[B]I . Hence,
Kbirds |=l (P | B)[0, 0.15]. That is, our statistical information suggests that at most 15
out of 100 birds in our population are penguins.
As usual, the satisfiability problem can be reduced to the l-entailment problem.
Proposition 8. K is inconsistent iff K |=l (⊤ | ⊤)[0, 0].
Proof. If K is inconsistent, thenMod(K) = ∅ and so K |=l (⊤ | ⊤)[0, 0].
Conversely, assume K |=l (⊤ | ⊤)[0, 0]. We have [⊤]I > 0 and
[⊤⊓⊤]I
[⊤]I
= 1 for all
interpretations I. Hence,Mod({(⊤ | ⊤)[0, 0]}) = ∅ and since K |=l (⊤ | ⊤)[0, 0], we
must haveMod(K) = ∅ as well. ⊓⊔
Often, we do not want to check whether a specific conditional is entailed, but rather
deduce tight probabilistic bounds for a statement. This problem is often referred to
as the probabilistic entailment problem in other probabilistic logics, see [6, 9, 13] for
instance. Consider a query of the form (C | D), where C,D are ALC concepts. We
define the p-Entailment problem similar to the probabilistic entailment problem for
type 2 probabilistic logics.
p-Entailment Problem: Given knowledge base K and a query (C | D), find minimal
and maximal solutions of the optimization problems
inf
I∈Mod(K)
/ sup
I∈Mod(K)
[C ⊓D]I
[D]I
subject to [D]I > 0
Since the objective function
[C⊓D]I
[D]I
is bounded from below by 0 and from above by
1, the infimum m and the maximum M are well-defined whenever there is a model
I ∈ Mod(K) such that [D]I > 0. In this case, we say that K p-entails (C | D)[m,M ]
and write K |=p (C | D)[m,M ]. In the context of type 2 probabilistic conditionals,
this entailment relation has also been called tight logical consequence [9]. If [D]I = 0
for all I ∈ Mod(K), the p-Entailment problem is infeasible, that is, there exists no
solution.
Example 9. In Example 7, we found that Kbirds |=l (P | B)[0, 0.15]. This bound is
actually tight. Since 0 is always a lower bound and we showed that 0.15 is an upper
bound, it suffices to give examples of interpretations that take these bounds. For the
lower bound, let I0 be an interpretation with 200 individuals. 100 of these individuals
are birds and 85 are birds that can fly. There are no penguins. Then I0 is a model of
Kbirds with [B]I0 > 0 that satisfies (P | B)[0, 0]. Construct I1 from I0 by letting the
15 non-flying birds be penguins. Then I1 is another model of Kbirds and I1 satisfies
(P | B)[0.15, 0.15]. Hence, we also have Kbirds |=p (P | B)[0, 0.15].
If K |=p (C | D)[m,M ], one might ask whether the values betweenm andM are
actually taken by some model of K or whether there can be large gaps in between. For
the probabilistic entailment problem for type 2 logics, we can show that the models of
K do indeed yield a dense interval by noting that each convex combination of models is
a model and applying the Intermediate Value Theorem from Real Analysis. However,
in our framework, we do not consider probability distributions over possible worlds, but
the worlds themselves, which are discrete in nature.We therefore cannot apply the same
tools here. However, for each two models that yield different probabilities for a query,
we can find another model that takes the probability in the middle of these probabilities.
Lemma 10 (Bisection Lemma). Let C,D be two arbitrary ALC concepts. If there
exist I0, I1 ∈ Mod(K) such that r0 =
[C⊓D]I0
[D]I0
< [C⊓D]
I1
[D]I1
= r1, then there is an
I0.5 ∈ Mod(K) such that
[C⊓D]I0.5
[D]I0.5
= r0+r12 .
Proof. Given an interpretation I and n ∈ N, we construct the interpretation I(n) as
follows. We set∆I
(n)
= {d1, . . . , dn | d ∈ ∆I}; that is, we make n different copies of
the domain. For allA ∈ NC, we setA
I(n) = {d1, . . . , dn | d ∈ A
I}, and for all r ∈ NR,
we set rI
(n)
= {(d1, e1), . . . , (d1, en), . . . (dn, e1), . . . , (dn, en) | (d, e) ∈ rI}. By
induction on the shape of ALC concepts, we can show that [F ]I = n[F ]I
(n)
for all
concepts F .
Let now (Ci | Di)[ℓi, ui], i = 1, . . . , |K| be all the conditionals from K. Let ℓ be
the least commonmultiple of all values from [D]I0 , [D]I1 , [D1]
I0 , [D1]
I1 , . . . , [Dn]
I0 ,
[Dn]
I1 that are non-zero, and k,K, k1,K1, . . . , kn,Kn be such that k[D]
I0 = ℓ,
K[D]I1 = ℓ, . . . , kn[Dn]
I0 = ℓ, Kn[Dn]
I1 = ℓ. Assume w.l.o.g. that I0 and I1 have
different domains (just rename the elements of one domain if necessary). For n,N ∈ N,
let In,N be the interpretation that is obtained from I
(n)
0 and I
(N)
1 by taking the union
of the domains, concept and role interpretations. That is, ∆In,N = ∆I
(n)
0 ∪ ∆I
(N)
1 ,
AIn,N = AI
(n)
0 ∪ AI
(N)
1 and rIn,N = rI
(n)
0 ∪ rI
(N)
1 . Consider k′ = k
∏n
i=1 ki,
k′−j = k
∏
i6=j ki,K
′ = K
∏n
i=1Ki andK
′
−j = K
∏n
i6=j Ki. Then, for i = 1, . . . , |K|,
[Ci ⊓Di]
Ik′n,K′N
[Di]
Ik′n,K′N
=
[Ci ⊓Di]I
(k′n)
0 + [Ci ⊓Di]I
(K′N)
1
[Di]I
(k′n)
0 + [Di]I
(K′N)
1
=
k′n[Ci ⊓Di]I0 +K ′N [Ci ⊓Di]I1
k′n[Di]I0 +K ′N [Di]I1
=
k′n[Ci ⊓Di]I0 +K ′N [Ci ⊓Di]I1
(k′−in+K
′
−iN)l
=
k′n
k′−in+K
′
−iN
[Ci ⊓Di]I0
ki[Di]I0
+
K ′N
k′−in+K
′
−iN
[Ci ⊓Di]I1
Ki[Di]I1
=
k′n
k′−in+K
′
−iN
[Ci ⊓Di]
I0
[Di]I0
+
K ′−iN
k′−in+K
′
−iN
[Ci ⊓Di]
I1
[Di]I1
.
The last equality shows that
[Ci⊓Di]
I
k′n,K′N
[Di]
I
k′n,K′N
is a convex combination of
[Ci⊓Di]
I0
[Di]I0
and
[Ci⊓Di]
I1
[Di]I1
. Since, I0 and I1 satisfy the i-th conditional, Ik′n,K′N satisfies the condi-
tional as well. In case that both [Di]
I0 = 0 and [Di]
I1 = 0, we have [Di]
Ik′n,K′N = 0
as well and so the conditional is still satisfied. If only [Di]
I0 = 0, we can see from
the second inequality that
[Ci⊓Di]
I
k′n,K′N
[Di]
I
k′n,K′N
= k
′n0+K′N [Ci⊓Di]
I1
k′n0+K′N [Di]I1
= [Ci⊓Di]
I1
[Di]I1
and
the conditional is still satisfied. The case [Di]
I1 = 0 is analogous of course. Hence,
Ik′n,K′N ∈Mod(K) for all choices of n and N .
Let k0 =
∏n
i=1 ki andK0 =
∏n
i=1Ki. Then we can show completely analogously
that
[C⊓D]
I
k′n,K′N
[D]
I
k′n,K′N
= k0nk0n+K0N
[Ci⊓Di]
I0
[Di]I0
+ K0Nk0n+K0N
[Ci⊓Di]
I1
[Di]I1
. Letting n = K ′ and
N = K ′, we have [C⊓D]
I
k′K′,K′k′
[D]
I
k′K′,K′k′
= 12
[Ci⊓Di]
I0
[Di]I0
+ 12
[Ci⊓Di]
I1
[Di]I1
= r0+r12 . ⊓⊔
We can now show that for each value between the lower and upper bound given by
p-entailment, we can find a model that gives a probability arbitrarily close to this value.
Proposition 11 (Intermediate Values). Let K |=p (C | D)[m,M ]. Then for every
x ∈ (m,M) (where (m,M) denotes the open interval between m and M ) and for all
ǫ > 0, there is a Ix,ǫ ∈Mod(K) such that |
[C⊓D]Ix,ǫ
[D]Ix,ǫ
− x| < ǫ.
Proof. Since K |=p (C | D)[m,M ], there must exist an I0 ∈ Mod(K) such that
m ≤ [C⊓D]
I0
[D]I0
≤ x and an I1 ∈ Mod(K) such that x ≤
[C⊓D]I1
[D]I1
≤M .
Consider the following bisection algorithm: we let I⊥0 = I0, I
⊤
0 = I1. Then start-
ing from i = 1, we let I0.5i be the model of K that is obtained from I
⊥
i−1 and I
⊤
i−1
as explained in the bisection lemma. If
[C⊓D]I
0.5
i
[D]I
0.5
i
= x, we are done. Otherwise, if
[C⊓D]I
0.5
i
[D]I
0.5
i
< x, we let I⊥i = I
⊥
i−1 and I
⊤
i = I
0.5. Otherwise, we have
[C⊓D]I
0.5
i
[D]I
0.5
i
< x,
and we let I⊥i = I
0.5
i and I
⊤
i = I
⊤
i−1. By construction, we maintain the invariant
[C⊓D]I
⊥
i
[D]I
⊥
i
≤ x ≤ [C⊓D]
I
⊤
i
[D]I
⊤
i
and we have
[C⊓D]I
⊤
i
[D]I
⊤
i
− [C⊓D]
I
⊥
i
[D]I
⊥
i
≤ M−m2n . Hence, after at
most i =
⌈
log
(
M−m
ǫ
)⌉
iterations, I0.5i is a model of K that proves the claim. ⊓⊔
3 Logical Properties
We now discuss some logical properties of Statistical ALC. We already noted that Sta-
tistical ALC generalizes classical ALC in Proposition 4. Furthermore, p-entailment
yields a tight and dense (Proposition 11) answer interval for all queries whose condi-
tion can be satisfied by models of the knowledge base. Let us also note that statistical
ALC is language invariant. That is, increasing the language by adding new concept or
role names does not change the semantics of ALC. This can be seen immediately by
observing that the interpretation of conditionals in (1) depends only on the concept and
role names that appear in the conditional.
Statistical ALC is also representation invariant in the sense that for all concepts
C1, D1 and C2, D2, if C1 ≡ C2 and D1 ≡ D2 then (C1 | D1)[l, u] ≡ (C2 | D2)[l, u].
Hence, changing the syntactic representation of conditionals does not change their se-
mantics. In particular, entailment results are independent of such changes.
Both l- and p-entailment satisfy the following independence property: whether or
not K |=l (C | D)[ℓ, u] (K |=p (C | D)[m,M ]) depends only on the conditionals
in K that are connected with the query. This may simplify answering the query by
reducing the size of the KB. In order to make this more precise, we need some additional
definitions. For an arbitraryALC concept C, Sig(C) denotes the set of all concept and
role names appearing in C. The conditionals (C1 | D1)[ℓ1, u1] and (C2 | D2)[ℓ2, u2]
are directly connected (written (C1 | D1)[ℓ1, u1] ⇋ (C2 | D2)[ℓ2, u2]) if and only
if (Sig(C1) ∪ Sig(D1)) ∩ (Sig(C2) ∪ Sig(D2)) 6= ∅. That is, two conditionals are
directly connected iff they share concept or role names. Let ⇋∗ denote the transitive
closure of ⇋. We say that (C1 | D1)[ℓ1, u1] and (C2 | D2)[ℓ2, u2] are connected iff
(C1 | D1)[ℓ1, u1]⇋∗ (C2 | D2)[ℓ2, u2]. The restriction ofK to conditionals connected
to (C | D)[ℓ, u] is the set {κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)[ℓ, u]}. Using an analogous definition
for queries (qualitative conditionals) (C1 | D1) and (C2 | D2), we get the following
result.
Proposition 12 (Independence). If K is consistent, we have
1. K |=l (C | D)[ℓ, u] iff {κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)[ℓ, u]} |=l (C | D)[ℓ, u].
2. K |=p (C | D)[m,M ] iff {κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)} |=p (C | D)[m,M ].
Proof. For both claims, it suffices to show that for each model I1 of K, there is a
model I2 of {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋∗ (C | D)} ({κ ∈ K | κ ⇋∗ (C | D)[ℓ, u]}) such that
[D]I1 = [D]I2 and [C ⊓D]I1 = [C ⊓D]I2 and vice versa.
If I1 is a model of K, let I2 be the restriction of I1 to the concept and role names
in {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋∗ (C | D)}. Then I2 is still a model of {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋∗ (C | D)}. In
particular, [D]I1 = [D]I2 and [C ⊓D]I1 = [C ⊓D]I2 .
Conversely, let I2 be a model of {κ ∈ K | κ ⇋
∗ (C | D)}. By consistency of K,
there is a model I0 ofK. Let I1 be the interpretation defined as the disjoint union of I0
and I2. Since {κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)} and K\{κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)} do not share
any concept and role names by definition of connectedness, I1 satisfies conditionals in
{κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)} iff I2 does and conditionals in K \ {κ ∈ K | κ⇋∗ (C | D)}
iff I0 does. Hence, I1 is a model of K. In particular, it holds that [D]I1 = [D]I2 and
[C ⊓D]I1 = [C ⊓D]I2 . ⊓⊔
Another interesting property of probabilistic logics is continuity. Intuitively, continuity
states that minor changes in the knowledge base do not yield major changes in the
derived probabilities. However, as demonstrated by Courtney and Paris, this condition is
too strong when reasoningwith the maximum entropymodel of the knowledge base [14,
p. 90]. The same problem arises for the probabilistic entailment problem [16, Example
4]. While these logics considered subjective probabilities, the same problem occurs in
our setting for statistical probabilities as we demonstrate now.
Example 13. Consider the knowledge base
K = {(B | A)[0.4, 0.5], (C | A)[0.5, 0.6], (B | C)[1, 1], (C | B)[1, 1]}.
The interpretation I = ({a, b}, ·I) with AI = {a, b}, BI = CI = {b} is a model of
K, i.e., K is consistent. In particular, since A is interpreted by the whole domain of I
we know that
K |=p (A | ⊤)[m, 1]
for some m ∈ [0, 1]. As explained in Proposition 4, deterministic conditionals cor-
respond to concept inclusions and so (B | C)[1, 1] and (C | B)[1, 1] imply that
BI
′
= CI
′
for all models I ′ of K. Therefore, [B⊓A]
I
′
[A]I′
= [C⊓A]
I
′
[A]I′
. Let K′ denote
the knowledge base that is obtained from K by decreasing the upper bound of the first
conditional in K by an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0. That is,
K′ = {(B | A)[0.4, 0.5− ǫ], (C | A)[0.5, 0.6], (B | C)[1, 1], (C | B)[1, 1]}.
Then the only way to satisfy the first two conditionals in K′ is by interpretingA by the
empty set. Indeed, the interpretation I∅ that interprets all concept names by the empty
set is a model of K′. So K′ is consistent and
K′ |=p (A | ⊤)[0, 0].
Hence, a minor change in the probabilities in the knowledge base can yield a severe
change in the entailed probabilities. This means that the p-entailment relation that we
consider here is not continuous in this way either.
As an alternative to this strong notion of continuity, Paris proposed to measure the
difference between KBs by the Blaschke distance between their models. Blaschke con-
tinuity says that if KBs are close with respect to the Blaschke distance, the entailed
probabilities are close. Blaschke continuity is satisfied by some probabilistic logics un-
der maximum entropy and probabilistic entailment [14, 16]. In [14, 16], probabilistic
interpretations are probability distributions over a finite number of classical interpre-
tations and the distance between two interpretations is the distance between the corre-
sponding probability vectors. We cannot apply this definition here because we interpret
conditionals by means of classical interpretations. It is not at all clear what a reasonable
definition for the distance between two classical interpretations is. We leave the search
for a reasonable topology on the space of classical interpretations for future work.
4 Statistical EL
Proposition 4 and the fact that reasoning in ALC is EXPTIME-complete, show that our
reasoning problems are EXPTIME-hard. However, we did not find any upper bounds on
the complexity of reasoning in ALC so far. We will therefore focus on some fragments
of ALC now.
To begin with, we will focus on the sublogic EL [1] of ALC that does not allow
for negation and universal quantification. Formally, EL concepts are constructed by the
grammar ruleC ::= A | ⊤ | C⊓C | ∃r.C, whereA ∈ NC and r ∈ NR. A statistical EL
KB is a statisticalALC KBwhere conditionals are restricted to EL concepts. Notice that,
due to the upper bounds in conditionals, statistical EL KBs are capable of expressing
some weak variants of negations. For instance, a statement (C | ⊤)[ℓ, u] with u < 1
restricts every model I = (∆I , ·I) to contain at least one element δ ∈ ∆I \ CI . Thus,
contrary to classical EL, statistical EL KBs may be inconsistent.
Example 14. Consider the KB K1 = (∅, C1), where
C1 = {(A | ⊤)[0, 0.2], (A | ⊤)[0.3, 1]}.
Since ⊤I = ∆I 6= ∅, every model I = (∆I , ·I) of K1 must satisfy
[A]I ≤ 0.2[⊤]I < 0.3[⊤]I ≤ [A]I ,
which is clearly a contradiction. Thus, K1 is inconsistent.
More interestingly, though, it is possible to simulate valuations over a finite set of propo-
sitional formulas wit the help of conditional statements. Thus, the satisfiability problem
is at least NP-hard even for Statistical EL.
Theorem 15. The satisfiability problem for Statistical EL is NP-hard.
Proof. We provide a reduction from the well-known coNP-complete problem of decid-
ing validity of a 3DNF formula. Let ϕ =
∨n
i=1 κi be a 3DNF formula; that is, each
κi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n is a conjunction of three literals κi = λ1i ∧ λ
2
i ∧ λ
3
i . We construct a
statistical EL KB as follows. Let V be the set of all variables appearing in ϕ. For every
x ∈ V , we use two concept names Ax and A¬x. In addition, for every clause κi we
introduce a concept name Bi, and create an additional concept name C.
Consider the KB Kϕ = (Tϕ, Cϕ), where
Tϕ := {
3l
j=1
Aλj
i
⊑ Bi, Bi ⊑ C | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Cϕ := {(Ax | ⊤)[0.5, 1], (A¬x | ⊤)[0.5, 1], (A¬x | Ax)[0, 0]} ∪ {(C | ⊤)[0, 0.5]}.
Then it holds that ϕ is valid iff Kϕ is inconsistent. ⊓⊔
On the other hand, consistency can be decided in non-deterministic exponential
time, through a reduction to integer programming. Before describing the reduction in
detail, we introduce a few simplifications.
Recall from Proposition 4 that a conditionals of the form (D | C)[1, 1] is equivalent
to the classical GCI C ⊑ D. Thus, in the following we will often express statistical EL
KBs as pairs K = (T , C), where T is a classical TBox (i.e., a finite set of GCIs), and C
is a set of conditionals. A statistical EL KB K = (T , C) is said to be in normal form if
all the GCIs in T are of the form
A1 ⊓ A2 ⊑ B, A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.A ⊑ B
and all its conditionals are of the form
(A | B)[ℓ, u]
where A,B ∈ NC ∪ {⊤}, and r ∈ NR. Informally, a KB is in normal form if at
most one constructor is used in any GCI, and all conditionals are atomic (i.e., between
concept names). Every KB can be transformed to an equivalent one (w.r.t. the original
signature) in linear time using the normalization rules from [1], and introducing new
concept names for complex concepts appearing in conditionals. More precisely, we
replace any conditional of the form (C | D)[ℓ, u] with the statement (A | B)[ℓ, u],
whereA,B are two fresh concept names, and extend the TBox with the axiomsA ≡ C,
and B ≡ D.
The main idea behind our consistency algorithm is to partition the finite domain of
a model into the different types that they define, and use integer programming to verify
that all the logical and conditional constraints are satisfied. LetNC(K) denote the set of
all concept names appearing in the KB K. We call any subset θ ⊆ NC(K) a type for K.
Intuitively, such a type θ represents all the elements of the domain that are interpreted
to belong to all concept names A ∈ θ and no concept name A /∈ θ. We denote as Θ(K)
the set of all types of K. To simplify the presentation, in the following we treat ⊤ as a
concept name that belongs to all types.
Given a statistical EL KB K = (T , C) in normal form, we consider an integer
variablexθ for every type θ ∈ Θ(K). These variableswill express the number of domain
elements that belong to the corresponding type. In addition, x⊤ will be used to represent
the total size of the domain.We build a system of linear inequalities over these variables
as follows. First, we require that all variables have a value at least 0, and that the sizes
of all types add exactly the size of the domain.∑
θ∈Θ(K)
xθ = x⊤ (2)
0 ≤ xθ for all θ ∈ Θ(K) (3)
Then, we ensure that all the conditional statements from the KB are satisfied by adding,
for each statement (A | B)[ℓ, u] ∈ C the constraint
ℓ ·
∑
B∈θ
xθ ≤
∑
A,B∈θ
xθ ≤ u ·
∑
B∈θ
xθ, (4)
Finally, we must ensure that the types satisfy all the logical constraints introduced by
the TBox. The GCI A1 ⊓A2 ⊑ B states that every element that belongs to bothA1 and
A2 must also belong to B. This means that types containing A1, A2 but excluding B
should not be populated. We thus introduce the inequality
xθ = 0 if A1 ⊓ A2 ⊑ B ∈ T , A1, A2 ∈ θ, and B /∈ θ (5)
Dealing with existential restrictions requires checking different alternatives, which we
solve by creating different linear programs. The GCI A ⊑ ∃r.B implies that, whenever
there exists an element in A, there must also exist at least one element in B. Thus, to
satisfy this axiom, either A should be empty (i.e.,
∑
A∈θ xθ = 0), or
∑
B∈θ xθ ≥ 1.
Hence, for every existential restriction of the form A ⊑ ∃r.B, we define the set
EA,B := {
∑
A∈θ
xθ = 0,
∑
B∈θ
xθ ≥ 1}
To deal with GCIs of the form ∃r.A ⊑ B, we follow a similar approach, together with
the ideas of the completion algorithm for classical EL. For every pair of existential
restrictions A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.C ⊑ D, we define the set
FA,B,C,D := {
∑
A∈θ,D/∈θ
xθ = 0,
∑
B∈θ,C/∈θ
xθ ≥ 1}
Intuitively,
∑
A∈θ,D/∈θ xθ ≥ 1 whenever there exists an element that belongs to A but
not toD. If this is the case, and the GCIs A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.C ⊑ D belong to the TBox T ,
then there must exist some element that belongs to B but not to C.
We call the hitting sets of
{EA,B | A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T } ∪ {FA,B,C,D | A ⊑ ∃r.B, ∃r.C ⊑ D ∈ T }
choices for T . A program forK is an integer program containing all the inequalities (2)–
(5) and a choice for T . Then we get the following result.
Lemma 16. K is consistent iff there exists a program for K that is satisfiable.
Proof. The “only if” direction is straight-forward since the inequalities are sound w.r.t.
the semantics of statistical KBs. We focus on the “if” direction only.
Given a solution of the integer program, we construct an interpretation I = (∆, ·I)
as follows. We create a domain∆ with x⊤ elements, and partition it such that for every
type θ ∈ Θ(K), there is a class [[θ]] containing exactly xθ elements. For every non-
empty class, select a representative element δθ ∈ [[θ]].
The interpretation function ·I maps every concept name A to the set
AI :=
⋃
A∈θ
[[θ]].
Given a non-empty class [[θ]] such that A ∈ θ and A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T , let τ be a type such
that B ∈ τ , xτ > 0, and for every ∃r.C ⊑ D ∈ T , if D /∈ θ, then C /∈ τ . Notice
that such a τ must exist because the solution must satisfy at least one restriction in each
FA,B,C,D. We define rθA,B := θ × {δτ} and set
rI :=
⋃
A∈θ,A⊑∃r.B∈T
rθA,B.
It remains to be shown that I is a model of K.
Notice that for two concept names A,B, it holds that (A⊓B)I =
⋃
A,B∈θ[[θ]] and
hence [A⊓B]I | =
∑
A,B∈θ xθ . Given a conditional statement (A | B)[ℓ, u] ∈ C, since
the solution must satisfy the inequality (4), it holds that
ℓ · [B]I ≤ [A ⊓B]I ≤ u · [B]I .
For a GCI A1 ⊓ A2 ⊑ B ∈ T , by the inequality (5) it follows that for every type
θ containing both A1, A2, but not B, [[θ]] = ∅. Hence AI1 ∩ A
I
2 ⊆ B
I . For every
A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T , and every γ ∈ ∆, if γ ∈ AI then by construction there is an element
γ′ such that (γ, γ′) ∈ rI .
Finally, if (γ, γ′) ∈ rI , then by construction there exists a type θ and an axiom
A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T such that γ ∈ [[θ]] and γ′ = δτ . Then, for every GCI ∃r.C ⊑ D ∈ T ,
γ′ ∈ CI implies C ∈ τ and henceD ∈ θ which means that γ ∈ DI . ⊓⊔
Notice that the construction produces exponentially many integer programs, each of
which uses exponentially many variables, measured on the size of the KB. Since sat-
isfiability of integer linear programs is decidable in non-deterministic polynomial time
on the size of the program, we obtain a non-deterministic exponential time upper bound
for deciding consistency of statistical EL KBs.
Theorem 17. Consistency of statistical EL KBs is in NEXPTIME.
5 Reasoning with Open Minded KBs
In order to regain tractability, we now further restrict statistical EL KBs by disallow-
ing upper bounds in the conditional statements. We call such knowledge bases open
minded.
Definition 18 (Open Minded KBs). A statistical EL KB K = (T , C) is open minded
iff all the conditional statements (C | D)[ℓ, u] ∈ C are such that u = 1.
For the scope of this section, we consider only open minded KBs. The first obvious
consequence of restricting to this class of KBs is that negations cannot be simulated. In
fact, every open minded KB is consistent and, as in classical EL, can be satisfied in a
simple universal model.
Theorem 19. Every open minded KB is consistent.
Proof. Consider the interpretationI = ({δ}, ·I)where the interpretation functionmaps
every concept name A to AI := {δ} and every role name r to rI := {(δ, δ)}. It is easy
to see that this interpretation is such that CI = {δ} holds for every EL concept C.
Hence, I satisfies all ELGCIs and in addition [C ⊓D]I = [C]I = 1 which implies that
all conditionals are also satisfied. ⊓⊔
Recall that, intuitively, conditionals specify that a proportion of the population satisfies
some given properties. One interesting special case of p-entailment is the question how
likely it is to observe an individual that belongs to a given concept.
Table 1. Rules for decidingm-necessity
C1 if {(X,A1), (X,A2)} ⊆ S and A1 ⊓A2 ⊑ B ∈ T then add (X,B) to S
C2 if (X,A) ∈ S and A ⊑ ∃r.B ∈ T then add (A, r,B) to S
C3 if {(X, r, Y ), (Y,A)} ⊆ S and ∃r.A ⊑ B ∈ T then add (X,B) to S
L1 if (A | B)[ℓ, 1] ∈ C then L(A)← ℓ · L(B)
L2 if A1 ⊓A2 ⊑ B ∈ T then L(B)← L(A1) + L(A2)− 1
L3 if (B,A) ∈ S then L(A)← L(B)
Definition 20. Let K be an open minded KB, C a concept, andm ∈ [0, 1]. C ism-ne-
cessary in K if K p-entails (C | ⊤)[m, 1]. The problem of m-necessity consists in
deciding whether C ism-necessary in K.
We show that this problem can be solved in polynomial time. As in the previous sec-
tion, we assume that the KB is in normal form and additionally, that all conditional
statements (A | B)[ℓ, 1] ∈ C are such that ℓ < 1. This latter assumption is made
w.l.o.g. since the conditional statement (A | B)[1, 1] can be equivalently replaced by
the GCI B ⊑ A (see Proposition 4). Moreover, checking m-necessity of a complex
concept C w.r.t. the KB (T , C) is equivalent to decidingm-necessity of a new concept
name A w.r.t. the KB (T ∪ {A ≡ C}, C). Thus, in the following we consider w.l.o.g.
only the problem of deciding m-necessity of a concept name w.r.t. to a KB in normal
form.
Our algorithm extends the completion algorithm for classification of EL TBoxes to
in addition keep track of the lower bounds of necessity for all relevant concept names.
The algorithm keeps as data structure a set S of tuples of the form (A,B) and (A, r,B)
for A,B ∈ NC ∪ {⊤}. These intuitively express that the TBox T entails the subsump-
tions A ⊑ B and A ⊑ ∃r.B, respectively. Additionally, we keep a function L that
maps every element A ∈ NC ∪ {⊤} to a number L(A) ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, L(A) = n
expresses that K p-entails (A | ⊤)[n, 1].
The algorithm initializes the structures S and L as
S := {(A,A), (A,⊤) | A ∈ NC(K) ∪ {⊤}}
L(A) :=
{
0 if A ∈ NC(K)
1 if A = ⊤.
These structures are then updated using the rules from Table 1. In each case, a rule
is only applied if its execution extends the available knowledge; that is, if either S is
extended to include one more tuple, or a lower bound in L is increased. In the latter
case, only the larger value is kept through the function L.
The first three rules in Table 1 are the standard completion rules for classical EL.
The remaining rules update the lower bounds for the likelihood of all relevant concept
names, taking into account their logical relationship, as explained next.
Rule L1 applies the obvious inference associated to conditional statements: from
all the individuals that belong to B, (A | B)[ℓ, 1] states that at least 100ℓ% belong also
to A. Thus, assuming that L(B) is the lowest proportion of elements in B possible, the
proportion of elements inAmust be at least ℓ ·L(B). L3 expresses that if every element
of B must also belong to A, then there must be at least as many elements in A as there
are in B. Finally, L2 deals with the fact that two concepts that are proportionally large
must necessarily overlap. For example, if 60% of all individuals belong to A and 50%
belong to B, then at least 10% must belong to both A and B; otherwise, together they
would cover more than the whole domain.
The algorithm executes all the rules until saturation; that is, until no rule is appli-
cable. Once it is saturated, we can decidem-necessity from the function L as follows:
A ism-necessary iffm ≤ L(A). Before showing the correctness of this algorithm, we
show an important property.
Notice that the likelihood information from L is never transferred through roles.
The reason for this is that an existential restriction ∃r.B only guarantee the existence
of one element belonging to the conceptB. Proportionally, the number of elements that
belong to B tends to 0.
Example 21. Consider the KB ({⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A}, ∅). For any n ∈ N, construct the interpre-
tation In := ({0, . . . , n}, ·In), where AIn = {0} and rIn = {(k, 0) | 0 ≤ k ≤ n}. It
is easy to see that In is a model of the KB and [A]
In/[⊤]In < 1/n. Thus, the best lower
bound form-necessity of A is 0, as correctly given by the algorithm.
Theorem 22 (correctness). Let L be the function obtained by the application of the
rules until saturation and A0 ∈ NC . Then A0 ism-necessary iffm ≤ L(A).
Proof (sketch). It is easy to see that all the rules are sound, which proves the “if” di-
rection. For the converse direction, we consider a finite domain∆ and an interpretation
·I of the concept names such that [A]I/|∆| = L(A) and the post-conditions of the rules
L1–L3 are satisfied. Such interpretation can be obtained recursively by considering the
last rule application that updatedL(A). Assume w.l.o.g. that the domain is large enough
so that c/|∆| < m − L(A0), where c is the number of concept names appearing in K.
It is easy to see that this interpretation satisfies all conditional statements and the GCIs
A1 ⊓ A2 ⊑ B ∈ T . For every concept name A, create a new domain element δA and
extend the interpretation I such that δA ∈ B iff (A,B) ∈ S. Given a role name r, we
define rI := {(γ, δB) | A ⊑ ∃r.B, γ ∈ AI}. Then, this interpretation satisfies the KB
K, and [A0]I/|∆| ≤ L(A0) + c/|∆| < m. ⊓⊔
Thus, the algorithm can correctly decide m-necessity of a given concept name. It re-
mains only to be shown that the process terminates after polynomially many rule ap-
plications. To guarantee this, we impose an ordering in the rule applications. First, we
apply all the classical rules C1–C3, and only when no such rules are applicable, we
update the function L through the rules L1–L3. In this case, the rule that will update
to the largest possible value is applied first. It is known that only polynomially many
classical rules (on the size of T ) can be applied [1]. Deciding which bound rule to apply
next requires polynomial time on the number of concept names in K. Moreover, since
the largest update is applied first, the value of L(A) is changed at most once for every
concept name A. Hence, only linearly many rules are applied. Overall, this means that
the algorithm terminates after polynomially many rule applications, which yields the
following result.
Theorem 23. Decidingm-necessity is in P.
6 Related Work
Over the years, various probabilistic extensions of description logics have been investi-
gated, see, for instance, [3,7,8,10,12,15,17]. The one that is closest to our approach is
the type 1 extension of ALC proposed in the appendix of [11]. Briefly, [11] introduces
probabilistic constraints of the form P (C | D) ≤ p, P (C | D) = p, P (C | D) ≥ p for
ALC conceptsC,D. These correspond to the conditionals (C | D)[0, p], (C | D)[p, p],
(C | D)[p, 1], respectively. Conversely, each conditional can be rewritten as such a
probabilistic constraint. However, there is a subtle but fundamental difference in the
semantics. While the definition in [11] allows for probability distributions over arbi-
trary domains, we do not consider uncertainty over the domain. This comes down to
allowing only finite domains and only the uniform distribution over this domain; that is,
our approach further restricts the class of models of a KB. One fundamental difference
between the two approaches is that Proposition 4 does not hold in [11]: the reason is
that the conditional (C | D)[1, 1] can be satisfied by an interpretation I that contains
an element x ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)I , where x has probability 0.
This difference is the main reason why the EXPTIME algorithm proposed by Lutz
and Schro¨der cannot be transferred to our setting. It does not suffice to consider the
satisfiable types independently, but other implicit subsumption relations may depend
on the conditionals only.
Example 24. Consider the statistical EL KB K = (T , C) with
T := {⊤ ⊑ ∃r.A, ∃r.B ⊑ C}
C := {(B | ⊤)[0.5, 1], (A | B)[0.5, 1], (A | ⊤)[0, 0.25]}
From C it follows that every element of A must also belong to B, and hence every
domain element must be an element of C. However,¬C defines a satisfiable type (w.r.t.
T ) which will be interpreted as non-empty in the model generated by the approach
in [11].
7 Conclusions
We have introduced Statistical ALC, a new probabilistic extension of the description
logic ALC for statistical reasoning. We analyzed the basic properties of this logic and
introduced some reasoning problems that we are interested in. As a first step towards
effective reasoning in Statistical ALC, we focused on EL, a well-known sublogic of
ALC that, in its classical form, allows for polynomial-time reasoning. We showed that
upper bounds in conditional constraints make the satisfiability problem in statistical
EL NP-hard and gave an NEXPTIME algorithm to decide satisfiability. We showed
that tractability can be regained by disallowing strict upper bounds in the conditional
statements.
We are going to provide more algorithms and a more complete picture of the com-
plexity of reasoning for StatisticalALC and its fragments in future work. A combination
of integer programming and the inclusion-exclusion principle may be fruitful to design
first algorithms for reasoning in full Statistical ALC.
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